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ABSTRACT
Intellectual property distinguishes a protected work’s aesthetic
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value from its functionality. In so doing, intellectual property law
>>

prevents fashion designers from asserting their rights over entire
garments. Apparel industry leaders have repeatedly proposed
legislation that would overcome this limitation, and the latest in
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a succession of draft bills is the Design Piracy Prohibition Act. In
critiquing the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, this Article surveys
fashion designers’ existing federal intellectual property rights,
particularly trade dress. In the most recent Supreme Court
exposition of the elements of a trade dress action, Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., the Court clarifies some
elements of the law, but leaves the threshold for establishing
secondary meaning unresolved. After Samara, federal district
courts have applied trade dress protection to fashion designers
without compromising policy objectives against broad intellectual
property rights. This Article concludes that trade dress,
specifically the secondary meaning element of trade dress, is an
underdeveloped area of law with potential to satisfy designers’
need for stronger intellectual property rights where other
legislative attempts have failed.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>Under

the rubric of copyright, patent and trademark, no

single intellectual property right protects a clothing design’s
aesthetic and functional aspects.2 Rather than acquiring rights
to an entire garment, image, or “look,” designers must
compartmentalize a piece of fashion into its functional3 and
aesthetic components, 4 and then obtain separate protections
for each. 5 However, fashion is not readily susceptible to such
compartmentalization. The aesthetic worth of a pair of pants, for
example, is inseparable from its utility as clothing. 6 Accordingly,
fashion designers have sought protection via the Design Piracy
Prohibition Act (DPPA), which would amend Chapter 13 of the
Copyright Act, to include fashion designs among the Copyright
Act’s protected “useful articles.” 7 Critiquing the need for sui
generis8 legislation, this Article surveys the intellectual property
rights currently applicable to fashion and identifies their
limitations. The Article then evaluates trade dress as coming the
closest to resolving designers’ compartmentalization problem, 9
and concludes that judicial expansion of trade dress would offer
moderate security from design piracy, without the adverse
economic and policy consequences of expansive sui generis
legislation.10

PAST AND PRESENT FASHION DESIGN PROTECTION: COPYRIGHT,
DESIGN PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS
<2>Fashion

designers typically rely on copyright, design patent

and trade dress to protect their nonfunctional works. In detail,
the Copyright Act extends intellectual property rights to “works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”11
The statute expands the U.S. Supreme Court’s Mazer v. Stein
holding, 12 and has been revised to extend protection to certain
named industries. 13 Despite legislative expansion of the
Copyright Act to benefit specific industries, copyright fails to
overcome the apparel industry’s compartmentalization problem,
whereby designers must distinguish between the useful and
aesthetic aspects of their works and assert separate rights to
each. 14
<3>The

threshold issue for whether a fashion warrants copyright

protection is which elements of the work are copyrightable.15
As was noted, a copyrightable work must be both original and
fixed in tangible form. 16 However, copyright does not extend to

useful design components, even where such components are
original and fixed in tangible form. A typical illustration of this
limitation is that neither the pocket of a jacket, nor the overall
jacket design, is copyrightable. As such, copyright has limited
application to fashion designers.
<4>Apart

from copyright, design patents also fail to meet

fashion designers’ need for holistic protection over an entire
garment. In general, design patents, which arise under the
Patent Act, 17 do not extend to designs “essential to the use” of
a protected work;18 rather, federal protection extends only to
works that are primarily ornamental. For example, a work that
is primarily ornamental would be the embroidery on a
compartment, as opposed to the compartment’s overall
configuration. 19 Thus, design patents, like copyright, do not
protect tailoring because the aesthetic and useful value of
tailoring are legally indistinguishable.
<5>Apart

from the Copyright Act and the Patent Act, the

Lanham Act, which governs federal trademark rights, offers
fashion designers comparatively more protection in the form of
trade dress.20 Trade dress refers to the “total image, design,
and appearance of a product,” including “size, shape, color,
color combinations, texture or graphics.”21 The Lanham Act
authorizes claims for trade dress infringement, false designation
of origin, false advertising and dilution,22 with remedies of
damages, preliminary injunctions, attorneys’ fees and corrective
advertising costs. 23
<6>Requisite

to an infringement action, the claimant must

establish the following: (1) the trade dress’s non-functionality 24
and “source-identifying role,” either through inherent
distinctiveness or secondary meaning; 25 and (2) a likelihood of
consumers confusing the defendant’s product or service with the
claimant’s. 26 In general, courts deny trade dress for designs
that resemble mechanisms, as opposed to ornaments, because
mechanistic designs do not meet the non-functionality
requirement of trade dress protection.27 Whereas the
requirement of consumer confusion reflects the Lanham Act’s
origin in consumer advocacy, 28 the non-functionality
requirement lacks a clear policy basis and has been subject to
debate. 29
<7>Apart

from non-functionality, trade dress protection hinges

on the designer’s use of the trade dress. Specifically, trade
dress claims require a showing of inherent distinctiveness or
secondary meaning derived from mark use. 30 A designer may

not establish secondary meaning instantaneously, or even after
a single runway show, but must instead cultivate the trade dress
until consumers come to associate it with the designer. This rule
is inconsistent with the industry practice of abandoning new
designs well before they become ubiquitous. 31 Absent instant
trade dress protection, designers face uncertainty over whether
a work may warrant protection.32
<8>Revisiting

the undeveloped state of trade dress law, the

Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.
observed that courts should “classify ambiguous trade dress as
product design.” 33 To protect such a trade dress, claimants
must establish its secondary meaning, not mere inherent
distinctiveness. Although the Samara Court held that an
unregistered color lacked inherent distinctiveness sufficient to
support a trade dress infringement action, the Court ruled that
even colors may warrant trade dress protection if they have
acquired secondary meaning. 34 While the Samara opinion
advises courts against broadly extending trade dress protection,
the holding does not preclude applying trade dress protection to
fashion design. 35 Because the Supreme Court has not
addressed how trade dress applies to fashion design since
Samara,36 other federal courts have extended trade dress
protections on a case-by-case basis, leaving inconsistent case
law ripe for legislative intervention.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION’S SOLUTION TO THE SHORTCOMINGS IN
DESIGN PROTECTION
<9>Due

to competitor opposition and ideological arguments

against sui generis legislation, the fashion design industry has
sought such legislative intervention with limited success. 37
Congress has addressed design protection bills in each
convening session from the 96th session to the 102nd, and
again in the second session of the 109th Congress.38 The
Fashion Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA) 39 would allow
three years of copyright protection to fashion designers’ useful
articles.40 The DPPA would protect clothing, handbags, and
eyewear against both primary and secondary infringement, and
offer damages of $250,000 per violation or five dollars per
counterfeited article, whichever is greater. 41
<10> The

DPPA has assumed many forms throughout the years,

but first arose in the 1930s. 42 Critics attributed the DPPA
predecessors’ failure to overly broad language, disproportionate
benefit to elite designers, and the risk of making fashion

inaccessible to middle and lower-income consumers. Despite this
history of failure, proponents tout the current DPPA as a
breakthrough in helping prevent design piracy, and granting
U.S. designers protections on par with those of Europe. 43
Proponents argue that existing intellectual property rights fall
short of those afforded other industries, and the United States
risks a loss of fashion design talent to markets with more
expansive intellectual property rights.
<11> Designers’

aim for legislative subsidies in the Copyright Act

also has historical precedent among other industries.
Semiconductor mask works gained protection under the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,44 and boat hull
designs also received specifically tailored safeguards as “useful
article[s]” under the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act. 45 Both
acts’ legislative histories suggest Congress contemplated
including additional industries in the sui generis amendments to
Title 17. 46 However, unlike these other two industries, fashion
has not established its works constitute “useful article[s],” and
Congress likely will not amend the Copyright Act to limit an
already prospering industry’s exposure to competition.

OBTAINING FASHION DESIGN PROTECTION THROUGH TRADE DRESS
<12> Among

the existing intellectual property rights, trade dress

is perceived as the most appropriate for encompassing an entire
fashion design. 47 Trade dress offers practical advantages to
designers because it extends to both registered and
unregistered works and has no originality or fixation
requirement.48 In recent years, trade dress has shown promise
for fashion designers seeking to protect the nonfunctional
aspects of their works. In the representative case Cosmos
Jewelry Ltd. v. Po Sun Hon Co., a California district court upheld
the claimant jewelry designer’s trade dress right against a
defendant jewelry designer. 49 In 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling.50
<13> The

Cosmos defendant had used the claimant’s sand-

blasted gold plumeria pattern on pendants, necklaces, bracelets,
rings, and earrings. 51 As a threshold matter, the court
determined that the jewelry design “depict[ing] the plumeria
flower in yellow gold in a specific size and shape with a sandblasted matte finish on the petals and high-polished shiny
edges” was nonfunctional. 52 Accordingly, the court
distinguished the flower-patterned jewelry’s aesthetic value from
its function as jewelry. 53 After the court concluded that the
pattern was within the scope of trade dress protection, the

dispositive factor in the ruling was whether the claimant’s trade
dress had acquired secondary meaning. 54
<14> The

Court relied on four factors for secondary meaning: (1)

whether consumers “associate” the trade dress with the
claimant designer; (2) the “degree and manner” of the
claimant’s advertising; (3) the “length and manner” of the
claimant’s trade dress use; and (4) the exclusivity of this use. 55
Under this analysis, and after a finding of likelihood of consumer
confusion over the origin of the defendant’s infringing dress, the
district court awarded damages, attorney’s fees, and an
injunction against the defendant’s production of competing
jewelry. 56
<15> Although

the claimant had also raised a claim for copyright

infringement, the court denied this claim on grounds that the
plumeria pattern was ubiquitous in nature and, therefore, did
not meet the originality requirement of copyright protection.57
Thus, trade dress protection may prove viable for fashion
designers whose works fail to meet the originality requirement
of copyright protection.58 As evinced by Cosmos, trade dress
provides enough flexibility for designers to obtain protection
over entire fashions, so long as they consist of designs that
have secondary meaning.
<16> In

addition, as Cosmos indicates, courts remain receptive to

trade dress as protection for fashion designs. 59 Nevertheless,
Cosmos upholds trade dress rights that are less expansive than
those of the DPPA. For example, existing trade dress law does
not grant designers any proprietary interest in a derivative work
they have not created, whereas the DPPA would protect against
both primary and secondary infringement. 60 One additional
caveat to leaving fashion design protection to the courts is the
probability of circuit splits contributing to forum shopping.61
<17> If

history is any indication of the outcome of the DPPA

debate, fashion designers’ only recourse lies in appealing to the
courts for innovative applications of existing protections. 62 An
alternative of allowing a designer to control an entire garment
or “look,” as the DPPA proposes, would limit not only
competition among designers, but also purchasing power and
choice among consumers. Despite the Cosmos holding’s
potential to expand trade dress protection, the opinion also has
notable limitations. Specifically, Cosmos has yet to be followed,
pertains to jewelry rather than textiles, and does not address
whether the trade dress at issue has the secondary meaning
Samara requires. Nevertheless, Cosmos reignites trade dress as
a potential solution to the inadequacies of intellectual property

protection for fashion designers.
<18> Thus,

to raise a trade dress claim, fashion designers must

establish a trade dress’s distinctiveness in one of two ways:
inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning. The Samara and
Cosmos Courts both evaluate the strength of a product design’s
secondary meaning, and much of the continued debate
surrounding trade dress centers on establishing distinctiveness.
Fashion designers who establish this element obtain protection
more consistent with the demands of the industry.

CONCLUSION
<19> Trade

dress offers a potential alternative to sui generis

legislation for fashion designers seeking intellectual property
rights tailored to the industry. The best approach for apparel
designers seeking to protect their work from piracy is a
combination of existing intellectual property protections, with
emphasis on trade dress. Congress’s historical reluctance to
extend sui generis protection to designers affirms their need to
leverage the existing intellectual property framework, despite its
potential insufficiency.

PRACTICE POINTERS
File for trade dress registration with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office. Registration is
an advantage in infringement disputes, although it is
not a requirement of protection under the Lanham
Act.
Invest in advertising that associates the design with
the designer. Specifically, establish consumer
familiarity with a design before seeking trade dress
protection. Target consumers must recognize the
fashion design as the work of the designer, because
trade dress protection for non-packaging designs
requires secondary meaning in the eyes of
consumers.
Ensure the fashion design is available and visible to
the public for the duration of trade dress protection.
Modifying a trade dress or withdrawing it from the
market may forfeit protection.
Differentiate the functional elements of a fashion
design from its nonfunctional elements; only
nonfunctional elements which are solely eligible for
trade dress protection.
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